Sometimes I Think J. Kay Writes This Stuff Just to Get a Rise Out of People for the Sake of Lively Letters to the Ed

Today he hails Sharon's removal of every single Jew from Gaza (effectively making it Judenrein) as a "masterstroke," and chides Israel's current stiff-necked prime minister for not swiping a page from Arik's playbook:

Israel now has a Prime Minister who seems to have no desire to strike any sort of final deal in the West Bank, even an intelligent and fair one that would protect core Israeli interests — a short-sighted approach to a problem that isn’t going away: Ultimately, the Palestinians are a people apart from Jews, and they must one day have their own country in the West Bank, even at the risk of it becoming a broken, fenced-in failure like Gaza. 

But the only reason that Benjamin Netanyahu has the freedom to be stubborn is because of the hard decision that Ariel Sharon made nine years ago. He was a hard man, but when it counted he knew when to bend. Israel could use a leader like that right now.

Nuh uh, Jon. 'Twould be Israel that faced the risk--of committing suicide via a worthless "peace treaty." One highly doubts that Israel, a country no larger than the state of New Jersey, could survive another such "masterstroke" (really, a coup de grace).

Update: Also in the NatPo op-ed section, Gregory Levey, a Canadian who once wrote speeches for Sharon, is nostalgic for the sense of "optimism" the late leader once engendered:

For the last part of Sharon’s time in office, I was his English speechwriter. My impressions are coloured by the fact that I was in my mid-20s and Canadian, and not nearly as attuned to Middle East politics as the war-hardened Israelis I worked alongside. But I truly felt that there was a reason for optimism in the period leading up to his stroke — and it was all because a firm and strong hand was on the wheel. 

Sharon implemented the controversial disengagement from Gaza, and founded the centrist Kadima Party, which was rumoured to have further territorial withdrawals on its agenda. None of this, according to my understanding, was because the prime minister suddenly had become a dove or was eager to foster a sense of utopian harmony with the Palestinians. Rather, it was because he believed that the only way to protect the state of Israel was to forge a sustainable separation from its Palestinian neighbours. Throughout his controversial career, the security of his country was his North Star — as even his detractors generally acknowledge...

My question for those like Greg who make it all about their own long-gone good "feelings": did Sharon's unilateral decision to "disengage" from Gaza make Israel more secure or less secure?

I rest my case.

Update: An anecdote about the era of pre-"disengagement" optimism: How well I recall the rose-coloured predictions of a leftist friend who had swallowed a whopping glass of "optimism" Kool Aid. She was certain that, once all the Jews had left Gaza, the Palestinians would leave Israel alone and begin to construct their own state. Two sovereign states living side-by-side in peace and amity would definitely be the end result, she gushed. Bubble-burster that I am, my succinct reply consisted of these three little words: "I doubt it."

Optimism is indeed a powerful drug; indeed, it's a narcotic. But as we learned from Sharon's "disengagement" debacle, misplaced optimism can kill your buzz, and maybe even kill you, quicker than you can say "'peace in our time' in our time."




These photos say it all: Gaza greenhouses before the "disengagement"...





...and afterwards.